extended his phalanx in long line and piled arms
under the high cliffs; and to all appearance he was there encamping.
The effect of this manouvre on the enemy in general was to relax the
prepared bent of their souls for battle, and to weaken their tactical
arrangements. Presently, however, wheeling his regiments (which were
marching in column) to the front, with the effect of strengthening the
beak-like (13) attack which he proposed to lead himself, at the same
instant he gave the order, "Shoulder arms, forward," and led the way,
the troops following.

(12) Grote ("H. G." x. 463) has another interpretation.

(13) Or, "the wedge-like attack of his own division"; see Grote, "H.
G." x. 469 foll. I do not, however, think that the attacking
column was actually wedge-shaped like the "acies cuneata" of the
Romans. It was the unusual depth of the column which gave it the
force of an ironclad's ram. Cf. "Cyrop." II. iv. for {eis
metopon}.

When the enemy saw them so unexpectedly approaching, not one of them
was able to maintain tranquility: some began running to their divisions,
some fell into line, some might be seen bitting and bridling their
horses, some donning their cuirasses, and one and all were like men
about to receive rather than to inflict a blow. He, the while, with
steady impetus pushed forward his armament, like a ship-of-war prow
forward. Wherever he brought his solid wedge to bear, he meant to cleave
through the opposing mass, and crumble his adversary's host to pieces.
With this design he prepared to throw the brunt of the fighting on the
strongest half of his army, while he kept the weaker portion of it in
the background, knowing certainly that if worsted it would only cause
discouragement to his own division and add force to the foe. The cavalry
on the side of his opponents were disposed like an ordinary phalanx
of heavy infantry, regular in depth and unsupported by foot-soldiers
interspersed among the horses. (14) Epaminondas again differed in
strengthening the attacking point of his cavalry, besides which he
interspersed footmen between their lines in the belief that, when he
had once cut through the cavalry, he would have wrested victory from the
antagonist along his whole line; so hard is it to find troops who will
care to keep their own ground when once they see any of their own side
flying. Lastly, to prevent any attempt on the part of the Athenians, who
were on the enemy's left