men otherwise qualified for high
responsibility. To put it plainly, _no man_ has the moral right to
suffer this upon any organization he is professing to serve.
The advice of one's subordinates, as to the placement and promotion of
men with whom they are in close contact, is not to be followed
undeviatingly. Men play favorites: they will sometimes back an
individual for no better reason than that they "like the guy." Too,
each small group leader, even the best one, will work to advance the
interests of his own men, because so doing is part of his own buildup.
Unless decisions are made from a central point of view, the
subordinate who talks the most convincingly will get an extra portion
of favor for his men, and jealousies will wrack the organization.
There is one last point. No officer can progress in fitting men to
jobs except as he becomes better informed about job requirements. This
is an essential part of his education. There is no administrative
technique which is separate and apart from knowledge of how basic work
is performed in the fields which have to be administered. A great many
officers resist this truth, but it is nonetheless valid.
What is eternally surprising in the fighting services is how the
aggressive questing for knowledge continues to pay large dividends,
and leads, in the average case, to a general forgiveness of one's
little sins and vices.
CHAPTER TWENTY-EIGHT
AMERICANS IN COMBAT
The command and control of men in combat _can_ be mastered by the
junior leaders of American forces short of actual experience under
enemy fire.
It is altogether possible for a young officer his first time in battle
to be in total possession of his faculties and moving by instinct to
do the right thing, provided that he has made the most of his training
opportunities.
Exercise in the maneuvering of men is only an elementary introduction
to this educational process. The basic requirement is a continuing
study, first of the nature of men, second of the techniques which
produce unified action, and last, of the history of past operations,
which are covered by an abundant literature.
Provided always that this collateral study is sedulously carried
forward by the individual officer, at least 90 percent of all that is
given him during the training period becomes applicable to his
personal action and his power to lead other men when under fire.
Each service has its separate character. The fighting
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