or
_marching which does not serve a clear and direct operational purpose_
is unjustifiable. The supreme object is to keep men as physically
fresh and mentally alert as possible. Tired men take fright and are
half-whipped before the battle opens. Worn-out officers cannot make
clear decisions. The conservation of men's powers, not the exhaustion
thereof, is the way of successful operation.
XX
When forces are committed to combat, it is vital that not one
unnecessary pound be put on any man's back. Lightness of foot is the
key to speed of movement and the increase of firepower. In judging of
these things, every officer's thought should be on the optimistic
side. It is better to take the chance that men will manage to get by
on a little less than to overload them, through an over-cautious
reckoning of every possible contingency, thereby destroying their
power to do anything effectively.
XXI
Even a thorough training and long practice in weapons handling will
not always insure that a majority of men will use their weapons freely
and consistently when engaging the enemy. This is particularly true of
Americans. In youth they are taught that the taking of human life is
wrong. This feeling is deep-rooted in their emotions. Many of them
cannot shake it off when the hour comes that their own lives are in
danger. They fail to fire, though they do not know exactly why. In
war, firing at an enemy target can be made a habit. Once required to
make the start, because he is given personal and intelligent
direction, any man will find it easier to fire the second and third
time, and soon thereafter his response will become automatic in any
tactical situation. When engaging the enemy, the most decisive task of
all junior leaders is to make certain that _all_ men along the line
are employing their weapons, even if this means spending some time
with each man and directing his fire. Reconnaissance and inspection
toward this end, particularly in the early stages of initial
engagement, are far more important than the employment of weapons by
junior leaders themselves, since this latter tends to distract their
attention from what the men are doing.
XXII
Unity of action develops from fullness of information. In combat, all
ranks have to know what is being done, and why it is being done, if
confusion is to be kept to a minimum. This holds true in all types of
operation, whatever the service. However, a surfeit of information
clouds t
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