Government put forward a
resolution in the House of Commons on February 7, 1729, for a grant of
some two hundred and fifty thousand pounds "for defraying the expense
of twelve thousand Hessians taken into his Majesty's pay." Even {292}
if the maintenance of this force had been a positive necessity, which
it certainly was not, it would, nevertheless, have been a necessity
bringing with it disparagement and danger to the Government responsible
for it. Pulteney made the most of the opportunity, and in a speech of
fine old English flavor denounced the proposal of the ministers.
[Sidenote: 1729--Subsidies voted] He asked with indignation whether
Englishmen were not brave enough or willing enough to defend their own
country without calling in the assistance of foreign mercenaries. It
might, he admitted, be some advantage to Hanover that German soldiers
should be kept in the pay of England, but he wanted to know what
benefit could come to the English people from paying and maintaining
such a band. These men were kept, he declared, in the pay of England,
not for the service of England, but for the service of Hanover. It
need hardly be said that during all the earlier years of the Brunswick
accession, a bare allusion to the name of Hanover was enough to stir an
angry feeling in the minds of the larger number of the English people.
Even the very men who most loyally supported the House of Brunswick
winced and writhed under any allusion to the manner in which the
interests of England were made subservient to the interests of Hanover.
Pulteney therefore took every pains to chafe those sore places with
remorseless energy. Sir William Wyndham supported Pulteney, and Sir
Robert Walpole himself found it necessary to throw all his influence
into the scale on the other side. His arguments were of a kind with
which the House of Commons has been familiar during many generations.
His main point was, that by maintaining a large body of soldiers,
Hessian among the rest, the country had been enabled to avoid war. The
Court of Vienna, with the assistance of Spanish subsidies, had been
making preparation for war, Walpole contended; and were it not for the
maintenance of this otherwise superfluous body of troops, the Emperor
of Austria would probably never have accepted the terms of peace. "If
you desire peace, {293} prepare for war," may be an excellent maxim,
but its value lies a good deal in its practical application. It is a
remarka