me to understand
that Russia would not precipitate war by crossing frontier
immediately, and a week or more would in any case elapse before
mobilization was completed. In order to find an issue out of a
dangerous situation it was necessary that we should in the
meanwhile all work together.--(British "White Paper" No. 78.)

Naivete or Cynicism?

Here it really becomes impossible to judge where the naivete of the
British Secretary of State ends and cynicism begins, for Sazonof could
not have told to him more plainly than in these lines that all Russia's
ostensible readiness for peace served no other purpose than to win time
to complete the strategical location of the Russian troops.

This point is emphasized by one document coming from a writer presumably
unbiased, but presumably distrustful of Germany, wherein the
confirmation is found that England and Russia had come to a full
agreement during these days.

On July 30 the Belgian Charge d'Affaires de l'Escaille in Petersburg
reported to the Belgian Government upon the European crisis. Owing to
the fast developing events of a warlike nature, this letter did not
reach its address by mail, and it was published later on. The Belgian
diplomatist writes:

It is undeniable that Germany tried hard here [that is, in
Petersburg] and in Vienna to find any means whatsoever in order to
forestall a general conflict....

And after M. de l'Escaille has told that Russia--what the Czar and his
War Minister with their highest assurances toward Germany had
denied--was mobilizing its own army, he continues:

Today at Petersburg one is absolutely convinced, yes, they have
even received assurances in that direction, that England and France
will stay by them. This assistance is of decisive importance and
has contributed much to the victory of the [Russian] war party.

This settles Grey's pretended "attempts at mediation." The truth is that
British politics decided to prevent a diplomatic success of Germany and
Austria, now worked openly toward the Russian aim. "The exertion of
pressure upon Berlin" included already a certain threat, mingled with
good advice.

On July 23 Grey had only spoken of four possible powers in war; hence
when on the German side some hope of England maintaining neutrality was
indulged in, this impression rested upon Grey's own explanations. On
July 29, however, after a political conversation with Princ