nd getting others to consider theirs, I do
not find that once in twenty times any such picture is formed, and when
it is, there is most commonly a particular effort of the imagination for
that purpose. But the aggregate words operate, as I said of the
compound-abstracts, not by presenting any image to the mind, but by
having from use the same effect on being mentioned, that their original
has when it is seen. Suppose we were to read a passage to this effect:
"The river Danube rises in a moist and mountainous soil in the heart of
Germany, where, winding to and fro, it waters several principalities,
until, turning into Austria, and laving the walls of Vienna, it passes
into Hungary; there with a vast flood, augmented by the Save and the
Drave, it quits Christendom, and rolling through the barbarous countries
which border on Tartary, it enters by many mouths in the Black Sea." In
this description many things are mentioned, as mountains, rivers,
cities, the sea, &c. But let anybody examine himself, and see whether he
has had impressed on his imagination any pictures of a river, mountain,
watery soil, Germany, &c. Indeed it is impossible, in the rapidity and
quick succession of words in conversation, to have ideas both of the
sound of the word, and of the thing represented; besides, some words,
expressing real essences, are so mixed with others of a general and
nominal import, that it is impracticable to jump from sense to thought,
from particulars to generals, from things to words, in such a manner as
to answer the purposes of life; nor is it necessary that we should.

SECTION V.

EXAMPLES THAT WORDS MAY AFFECT WITHOUT RAISING IMAGES.

I find it very hard to persuade several that their passions are affected
by words from whence they have no ideas; and yet harder to convince them
that in the ordinary course of conversation we are sufficiently
understood without raising any images of the things concerning which we
speak. It seems to be an odd subject of dispute with any man, whether he
has ideas in his mind or not. Of this, at first view, every man, in his
own forum, ought to judge without appeal. But, strange as it may appear,
we are often at a loss to know what ideas we have of things, or whether
we have any ideas at all upon some subjects. It even requires a good
deal of attention to be thoroughly satisfied on this head. Since I wrote
these papers, I found two very striking instances of the possibility
there is, that a