ontinuance of borrowing; that the increase of
borrowing and the increase of debt will go hand in hand; and lastly,
that the more money you want, the harder it will be to get it; and that
the scarcity of the commodity will enhance the price. Who ever doubted
the truth, or the insignificance, of these propositions? what do they
prove? that war is expensive, and peace desirable. They contain nothing
more than a commonplace against war; the easiest of all topics. To bring
them home to his purpose, he ought to have shown that our enemies had
money upon better terms; which he has not shown, neither can he. I shall
speak more fully to this point in another place. He ought to have shown
that the money they raised, upon whatever terms, had procured them a
more lucrative return. He knows that our expenditure purchased commerce
and conquest: theirs acquired nothing but defeat and bankruptcy.

Thus the author has laid down his ideas on the subject of war. Next
follow those he entertains on that of peace. The treaty of Paris upon
the whole has his approbation. Indeed, if his account of the war be
just, he might have spared himself all further trouble. The rest is
drawn on as an inevitable conclusion.[49] If the House of Bourbon had
the advantage, she must give the law; and the peace, though it were much
worse than it is, had still been a good one. But as the world is yet
_deluded_ on the state of that war, other arguments are necessary; and
the author has in my opinion very ill supplied them. He tells of many
things we have got, and of which he has made out a kind of bill. This
matter may be brought within a very narrow compass, if we come to
consider the requisites of a good peace under some plain distinct heads.
I apprehend they may be reduced to these: 1. Stability; 2.
Indemnification; 3. Alliance.

As to the first, the author more than obscurely hints in several places,
that he thinks the peace not likely to last. However, he does furnish a
security; a security, in any light, I fear, but insufficient; on his
hypothesis, surely a very odd one. "By stipulating for the entire
possession of the Continent (says he) the restored French islands are
become in some measure dependent on the British empire; and the good
faith of France in observing the treaty guaranteed by the value at which
she estimates their possession."[50] This author soon grows weary of his
principles. They seldom last him for two pages together. When the
advantages