gents, who might be used in raising a revolt among
the Pathan tribes. But the advantages which the Amir would derive from a
quarrel with the British are not apparent. It would seem more probable,
that he has only tried throughout to make his friendship a matter of
more importance to the Indian Government, with a view to the continuance
or perhaps the increase of his subsidy. It is possible, that he has this
year tested and displayed his power; and that he has desired to show
us what a dangerous foe he might be, were he not so useful an ally.
The question is a delicate and difficult one. Most of the evidence is
contained in Secret State Papers. The inquiry would be profitless; the
result possibly unwelcome. Patriotic discretion is a virtue which should
at all times be zealously cultivated.

I do not see that the facts I have stated diminish or increase the
probability of the Amir's complicity. As the American filibusters
sympathise with the Cuban insurgents; as the Jameson raiders supported
the outlanders of the Transvaal, so also the soldiers and tribesmen
of Afghanistan sympathised with and aided their countrymen and
coreligionists across the border. Probably the Afghan Colonial Office
would have been vindicated by any inquiry.

It is no disparagement but rather to the honour of men, that they should
be prepared to back with their lives causes which claim their sympathy.
It is indeed to such men that human advancement has been due. I do not
allude to this matter, to raise hostile feelings against the Afghan
tribesmen or their ruler, but only to explain the difficulties
encountered in the Mamund Valley by the 2nd Brigade of the Malakand
Field Force: to explain how it was that defenders of obscure villages
were numbered by thousands, and why the weapons of poverty-stricken
agriculturists were excellent Martini-Henry rifles.

The Mamunds themselves were now genuinely anxious for peace. Their
valley was in our hands; their villages and crops were at our mercy; but
their allies, who suffered none of these things, were eager to continue
the struggle. They had captured most of the rifles of the dead soldiers
on the 16th, and they had no intention of giving them up. On the other
hand, it was obvious that the British Raj could not afford to be defied
in this matter. We had insisted on the rifles being surrendered, and
that expensive factor, Imperial prestige, demanded that we should
prosecute operations till we got them, no m