s, of the power and influence of
the khans, or other rulers of the people; of the general history and
traditions of the country, is a task which must be entirely specialised.
Rough and ready methods are excellent while the tribes resist, but
something more is required when they are anxious to submit. Men are
needed who understand the whole question, and all the details of the
quarrel, between the natives and the Government, and who can in some
measure appreciate both points of view. I do not believe that such are
to be found in the army. The military profession is alone sufficient to
engross the attention of the most able and accomplished man.

Besides this I cannot forget how many quiet nights the 2nd Brigade
enjoyed at Inayat Kila when the "snipers" were driven away by the
friendly pickets; how many fresh eggs and water melons were procured,
and how easily letters and messages were carried about the country [As
correspondent of the Pioneer, I invariably availed myself of this method
of sending the press telegrams to the telegraph office at Panjkora, and
though the route lay through twenty miles of the enemy's country, these
messages not only never miscarried, but on several occasions arrived
before the official despatches or any heliographed news. By similar
agency the bodies of Lieutenant-Colonel O'Bryen and Lieutenant
Browne-Clayton, killed in the attack upon Agrah on the 30th of
September, were safely and swiftly conveyed to Malakand for burial.]
through the relations which the political officers, Mr. Davis and Mr.
Gunter, maintained, under very difficult circumstances, with these
tribesmen, who were not actually fighting us.

Respecting the second duty, it is difficult to believe that the
collection of information as to the numbers and intentions of the
enemy would not be better and more appropriately carried out by the
Intelligence Department and the cavalry. Civil officers should not
be expected to understand what kind of military information a general
requires. It is not their business. I am aware that Mr. Davis procured
the most correct intelligence about the great night attack at Nawagai,
and thus gave ample warning to Sir Bindon Blood. But on the other hand
the scanty information available about the Mamunds, previous to the
action of the 16th, was the main cause of the severe loss sustained on
that day. Besides, the incessant rumours of a night attack on Inayat
Kila, kept the whole force in their boots abou