of course, of no strategic value, and was merely used as a
habitation for the troops intended to hold Malakand, for whom there was
no room in the crater and fort. The north camp has now been definitely
abandoned.

Nobody, however--least of all those who selected the site--would seem
to have contemplated the possibility of an attack. Indeed the whole
situation was regarded as purely temporary. The vacillation, caused
by the change of parties and policies in England, led to the Malakand
garrison remaining for two years in a position which could not be well
defended either on paper or in reality. At first, after the Chitral
campaign of 1895, it was thought that the retention of the brigade in
this advanced post, was only a matter of a few weeks. But as the months
passed by the camp began, in spite of the uncertainty, to assume an
appearance of permanency. The officers built themselves huts and mess
rooms. A good polo ground was discovered near Khar, and under careful
management rapidly improved. A race-course was projected. Many officers
who were married brought their wives and families to the camp among
the mountains, and the whole place was rapidly becoming a regular
cantonment. No cases of Ghazi outrage broke the tranquillity. The
revolvers, which all persons leaving camp were by regulations obliged
to take, were either unloaded or carried by a native groom. Shooting
parties were organised to the hills. A well-contested polo tournament
was held in Christmas week. Distinguished travellers--even a member of
Parliament--visited this outpost of empire, and observed with interest
the swiftness and ease with which the Anglo-Saxon adapts every situation
to his sports and habits.

At the same time the station of the Malakand Brigade was far from being
a comfortable one. For two years they lived under canvas or in rude
huts. They were exposed to extremes of climate. They were without
punkahs or ice in the hot weather. They were nearly fifty miles from
the railway, and in respect of companionship and amusements were thrown
entirely on their own resources. When the British cavalry officer
succeeds, in spite of official opposition, expense and discouragement,
in getting on service across the frontier, he is apt to look with
envious eyes at the officers of the Frontier Force, who are taken as a
matter of course and compelled to do by command, what he would solicit
as a favour. But he must remember that this is their compensation f