ade inclosures of Major Anderson's
letter. The whole was immediately laid before Lieutenant-General Scott,
who at once concurred with Major Anderson in opinion. On reflection,
however, he took full time, consulting with other officers, both of
the army and the navy, and at the end of four days came reluctantly but
decidedly to the same conclusion as before. He also stated at the
same time that no such sufficient force was then at the control of the
government, or could be raised and brought to the ground within the time
when the provisions in the fort would be exhausted. In a purely military
point of view, this reduced the duty of the administration in the case to
the mere matter of getting the garrison safely out of the fort.

It was believed, however, that to so abandon that position, under the
circumstances, would be utterly ruinous; that the necessity under which
it was to be done would not be fully understood; that by many it would
be construed as a part of a voluntary policy; that at home it would
discourage the friends of the Union, embolden its adversaries, and go far
to insure to the latter a recognition abroad; that in fact, it would
be our national destruction consummated. This could not be allowed.
Starvation was not yet upon the garrison, and ere it would be reached
Fort Pickens might be reinforced. This last would be a clear indication
of policy, and would better enable the country to accept the evacuation of
Fort Sumter as a military necessity. An order was at once directed to be
sent for the landing of the troops from the steamship Brooklyn into Fort
Pickens. This order could not go by land, but must take the longer and
slower route by sea. The first return news from the order was received
just one week before the fall of Fort Sumter. The news itself was that
the officer commanding the Sabine, to which vessel the troops had been
transferred from the Brooklyn, acting upon some quasi armistice of
the late administration (and of the existence of which the present
administration, up to the time the order was despatched, had only too
vague and uncertain rumors to fix attention), had refused to land the
troops. To now reinforce Fort Pickens before a crisis would be reached
at Fort Sumter was impossible--rendered so by the near exhaustion
of provisions in the latter-named fort. In precaution against such a
conjuncture, the government had, a few days before, commenced preparing
an expedition as well adapted as mi