d
gratitude from their fellow-mortals, they do not stand altogether on
the same footing as Matthew, Mark, Luke and John, by whose pens has been
recorded "every word that proceedeth out of the mouth of God."

The modest enquirer therefore, without pretending to put himself on an
equality with these illustrious men, may be forgiven, when he permits
himself to suggest a few doubts, and presumes to examine the grounds
upon which he is called upon to believe all that is contained in the
above passages.

Now the foundations upon which astronomy, as here delivered, is built,
are, first, the evidence of our senses, secondly, the calculations of
the mathematician, and, in the third place, moral considerations. These
have been denominated respectively, practical astronomy, scientific, and
theoretical.

As to the first of these, it is impossible for us on this occasion
not to recollect what has so often occurred as to have grown into an
every-day observation, of the fallibility of our senses.

It may be doubted however whether this is a just statement. We are not
deceived by our senses, but deceived in the inference we make from our
sensations. Our sensations respecting what we call the external
world, are chiefly those of length, breadth and solidity, hardness and
softness, heat and cold, colour, smell, sound and taste. The inference
which the generality of mankind make in relation to these sensations
is, that there is something out of ourselves corresponding to the
impressions we receive; in other words, that the causes of our
sensations are like to the sensations themselves. But this is, strictly
speaking, an inference; and, if the cause of a sensation is not like the
sensation, it cannot precisely be affirmed that our senses deceive us.
We know what passes in the theatre of the mind; but we cannot be said
absolutely to know any thing, more.

Modern philosophy has taught us, in certain cases, to controvert the
position, that the causes of our sensations are like to the sensations
themselves. Locke in particular has called the attention of the
reasoning part of mankind to the consideration, that heat and cold,
sweet and bitter, and odour offensive or otherwise, are perceptions,
which imply a percipient being, and cannot exist in inanimate
substances. We might with equal propriety ascribe pain to the whip that
beats us, or pleasure to the slight alternation of contact in the person
or thing that tickles us, as suppose that