embers of the order had now to begin the work of
constructing their fortunes over again. But still they enjoyed the glory
of victory. They had the proud consciousness of having baffled, with
their own good swords, the whole strength of the Ottoman empire. The
same invincible spirit still glowed in their bosoms, and they looked
forward with unshaken confidence to the future.

[Sidenote: REVIEW OF THE SIEGE.]

Such were the results of this memorable siege,--one of the most
memorable sieges, considering the scale of the preparations, the amount
of the forces, and the spirit of the defence, which are recorded on the
pages of history. It would not be easy, even for a military man, after
the lapse of three centuries, to criticize with any degree of confidence
the course pursued by the combatants, so as to determine to what causes
may be referred the failure of the besiegers. One obvious fault, and of
the greatest moment, was that already noticed, of not immediately
cutting off the communications with St. Elmo, by which supplies were
constantly thrown into that fortress from the opposite side of the
harbor. Another, similar in its nature, was, that, with so powerful a
navy as the Turks had at their command, they should have allowed
communications to be maintained by the besieged with Sicily, and
reinforcements thus introduced into the island. We find Mustapha and
Piali throwing the blame of this mutually on each other, especially in
the case of Cardona, whose most seasonable succors might easily have
been intercepted, either by land or sea, with proper vigilance on the
part of the Turkish commanders. A serious impediment in the way of the
besiegers was the impossibility of forcing a subsistence for the troops
from a barren spot like Malta, and the extreme difficulty of obtaining
supplies from other quarters, when so easily intercepted by the enemy's
cruisers. Yet the Turkish galleys lying idle in the western port might
have furnished a ready convoy, one might suppose, for transports
bringing provisions from the Barbary coast. But we find no such thing
attempted. To all these causes of failure must be added the epidemic,
which, generated under the tropical heats of a Maltese summer, spread
like a murrain through the camp of the besiegers, sweeping them off by
thousands.

It operated well for the besieged, that the great advance made in the
science of fortification was such, in the latter half of the sixteenth
century, as in