y allow one no rest and may prevent one from ever again going
on gayly through life singing with Browning's _Pippa_:--

God's in His Heaven--
All's right with the world.

It is now twenty-six years since I first read Mr. Edward Carpenter's
penetrating essay, then but recently published, entitled _Civilization:
Its Cause and Cure_. The very name of the book made one ask: "Is
civilization then a disease?" And if one deigned, as I did, to read
the essay carefully, one found the author defending the affirmative
in all seriousness and with much thoroughness, and displaying acute
analytical power throughout his argument. The charge of whimsicality
could not hold against him. The author showed an adequate insight into
the social structure which is called civilization. What was equally
essential, his knowledge of the latest speculations as to the nature
of disease,--theories which have not yet been superseded and which
when applied by Sir Almroth Wright proved to be most fruitful working
hypotheses,--Carpenter's knowledge of these was comprehensive and
discriminating. He accordingly never pressed the analogy between
civilization and disease unduly--he knew that it could not be made to
fit all particulars. And he never fell into any confusion of thought;
he easily avoided being caught in his own metaphor. He employed it only
within limits and only when it rendered the moral issue more concrete
and vivid. Because he had a scientific knowledge both of civilization
and of disease, he could safely use language which appealed to the
moral emotions as an aid to our moral judgment.

Indeed, Mr. Carpenter showed himself not only scientific in his ethics,
but what is much rarer in these days, ethical in his science. For it is
questionable whether one can ever arrive at any moral judgment except
there be a deep and strong emotional accompaniment to one's rational
investigation. If we do not take sides with humanity at the outset, if
we eliminate all preference for certain kinds of conduct and goals of
pursuit which grew up in the human mind before we began our scientific
criticism of morals, how shall we ever get back again into the sphere
of distinctively ethical judgment? For instance, how could we strike
out from the field of observation the something which we count the
moral factor in life, and then proceed to investigate the morals of
trade? Evidently we must in every ethical enquiry start by taking sides
with that trend