agyars from
the interior of Hungary have no special reason to hate the Serbians,
and, aside from that, they were attacking on foreign soil.

At the head of the Austrian campaigns against Serbia was General
Potiorek, generally described as a textbook strategist. But just how
much his failures were due to his own inefficiency and how much to the
inefficiency of those under him will probably never be determined; he
had in the end to suffer for both.

These were the two great contending forces that were set in motion by
the departure of Baron Giesl, the Austro-Hungarian Minister, from
Belgrade, on July 25, 1914. On the same day the Prince Regent Alexander
signed a decree ordering the general mobilization of the Serbian army.
Three days later, on July 28, 1914, Austria declared war. By that time
Serbia was in the midst of her mobilization.

That the Austrians, who had the advantage of having taken the
initiative, and who had presumably chosen their own time for the opening
of hostilities, did not immediately take full advantage of their
favorable situation has caused much surprise among impartial military
critics. On the same day that they declared war they had the opportunity
to hurl their troops across the Danube and take Belgrade with
practically no opposition. Apparently they were not ready; from that
moment the difficulties that would have attended such a movement
increased hourly.

A force of 20,000 men was raised almost immediately for the defense of
Belgrade. To meet this opposition the Austrians had, on the evening of
the day war was declared, July 18, 1914, only one division concentrated
between Semlin and Pancsova, opposite Belgrade--a force that was hardly
sufficient to take the Serbian capital. Two days later an army corps
would have been needed for the enterprise, for by this time the Serbian
army had begun concentrating considerable numbers within striking
distance of the capital. Thus the first opportunity was lost by the
tardiness of the Austrians to act.

It is presumed that the reader has already studied the description of
this theatre of the war presented elsewhere in this work. Aside from
that, the movements that follow should only be traced with the aid of a
map. Written words are inadequate to give a concrete picture of the
field of operations.

The Austrian General Staff realized the difficulties of crossing the
Danube. Its general plan, probably prepared long before, contemplated a
main attac