their final
panegyric. The reasons for the Austrian _debacle_ on the Piave are as
follows: when the Allied troops had reached Rann, Susegana, Ponte di
Piave and Montiena, the Austrian High Command decided on October 24 to
throw against them the 36th Croat division, the 21st Czech, the 44th
Slovene, a German division and the 12th Croat Regiment of Uhlans.
However, the 16th and 116th Croat, the 30th Regiment of Czech Landwehr
and the 71st Slovene Landwehr Regiment declared that they would not
fight against the French and English, and, instead of advancing,
retired. The 78th Croat Regiment, as well as three other Czech
Regiments, abandoned the front, after having made a similar declaration.
At the same time the 96th and 135th Croat Regiments, in agreement with
the Czech detachments, made a breach for the Italians on the left wing
at Stino di Livenza, while Slav marching formations revolted at Udine.
The Austro-Hungarian troops consequently had to retreat.... No one
expects of the Italian army, as a whole, that it will be on a level
with the best, but when the British officers who were with the Serbs on
the Salonica front compare their reminiscences with those of the British
officers on the Italian front, it is improbable that garlands will be
strewn for the Italians. Towards the end of October a plan was adopted
by the British and Italian staffs for capturing the island of Papadopoli
in the Piave; this island, about three miles in length, formed the
outpost line of the Austrian defences. On the night of October 23-24 an
attack was to be made by the 2nd H.A.C., while three companies of the
1st Royal Welsh Fusiliers were to act as reserve. This operation is most
vividly described by the Senior Chaplain of the 7th Division, the Rev.
E. C. Crosse, D.S.O., M.C.;[1] and he says nothing as to what occurred
on that part of the island which was to be seized by the Italians. Well,
nothing had occurred, for the Italians did not get across and when the
water rose they said they could do nothing on that night. These are the
words of Mr. Crosse's footnote: "The obvious question, 'What was going
to be done with the farther half of the island?' we have purposely left
undiscussed here. This half was outside the area of the 7th Division,
and as such it falls outside the scope of this work for the time being.
The subsequent capture of the whole island (on the following night) by
the 7th Division was not part of the original plan." Afterwards,