me, dealing moral blows and putting himself on his defense as
if really in earnest. It is the master's business to require this duty,
and to commend it according as it is well executed. For if they love
praise to the degree of seeking it in their faults, which does them much
harm, they will desire it more passionately when they know it to be the
reward of real merit. The misfortune now is that they commonly pass over
necessary things in silence, considering what is for the good of the
cause as of little or no account if it be not conducive to the
embellishment of the discourse.

THE PERORATION

The peroration, called by some the completion, by others the conclusion,
of a discourse, is of two kinds, and regards either the matters discust
in it or the moving of the passions.

The repetition of the matter and the collecting it together, which is
called by the Greeks recapitulation, and by some of the Latins
enumeration, serves for refreshing the judge's memory, for placing the
whole cause in one direct point of view, and for enforcing in a body
many proofs which, separately, made less impression. It would seem that
this repetition ought to be very short, and the Greek term sufficiently
denotes that we ought to run over only the principal heads, for if we
are long in doing it, it will not be an enumeration that we make, but,
as it were, a second discourse. The points which may seem to require
this enumeration, however, ought to be pronounced with some emphasis,
and enlivened with opposite thoughts, and diversified by figures,
otherwise nothing will be more disagreeable than a mere cursory
repetition, which would seem to show distrust of the judge's memory.

RULES FOR THE PERORATION

This seems to be the only kind of peroration allowed by most of the
Athenians and by almost all the philosophers who left anything written
on the art of oratory. The Athenians, I suppose, were of that opinion
because it was customary at Athens to silence, by the public crier, any
orator who should attempt to move the passions. I am less surprized at
this opinion among philosophers, every perturbation of the mind being
considered by them as vicious; nor did it seem to them compatible with
sound morality to divert the judge from truth, nor agreeable to the idea
of an honest man to have recourse to any sinister stratagem. Yet moving
the passions will be acknowledged necessary when truth and justice can
not be otherwise obtained and w