y." There is no more
authority specifically conferred upon the marshal by this section to
protect the judge from assassination in open court, without a specific
order or command, than there is to protect him out of court, when on
the way from one court to another in the discharge of his official
duties. The marshals are in daily attendance upon the judges,
and performing official duties in their chambers. Yet no statute
specifically points out those duties or requires their performance.
Indeed, no such places as chambers for the circuit judges or circuit
justices are mentioned at all in the statutes. Yet the marshal is as
clearly authorized to protect the judges there as in the court-room.
All business done out of court by the judge is called chamber
business. But it is not necessary to be done in what is usually
called chambers. Chamber business may be done, and often is done, on
the street, in the judge's own house, at the hotel where he stops,
when absent from home, or it may be done in transitu, on the cars in
going from one place to another within the proper jurisdiction to
hold court. Mr. Justice Field could, as well, and as authoritatively,
issue a temporary injunction, grant a writ of _habeas corpus_, an
order to show cause, or do any other chamber business for the
district in the dining-room at Lathrop, as at his chambers in San
Francisco, or in the court-room. The chambers of the judge, where
chambers are provided, are not an element of jurisdiction, but are a
convenience to the judge, and to suitors--places where the judge at
proper times can be readily found, and the business conveniently
transacted.

But inasmuch as the Revised Statutes of the United States (sec.
753) declare that the writ of _habeas corpus_ shall not extend to "a
prisoner in jail unless where he is in custody--for an act done or
omitted in pursuance of a _law_ of the United States, or of an order,
process, or decree of a court or judge thereof, or in custody in
violation of the Constitution or of a law or treaty of the United
States," it was urged in the argument by counsel for the State that
there is no statute which specifically makes it the duty of a marshal
or deputy marshal to protect the judges of the United States whilst
out of the court-room, travelling from one point to another in their
circuits, on official business, from the violence of litigants who
have become offended at the adverse decisions made by them in the
performance