eace of the State is
devolved solely upon the officers of the State, and not in any respect
upon the marshals of the United States, the court replied: This
position is already answered by what has been said. But it is
undoubtedly true that it was the imperative duty of the State
to preserve the public peace and amply protect the life of Justice
Field, _but it did not do it_, and had the United States relied upon
the State to keep the peace as to him--one of the justices of the
highest court--in relation to matters concerning the performance of
his official duties, they would have leaned upon a broken reed. The
result of the efforts to obtain an officer from the State to assist
in preserving the peace and protecting him at Lathrop was anything
but successful. The officer of the State at Lathrop, instead of
arresting the conspirator of the contemplated murderer, the wife of
the deceased, arrested the officer of the United States, assigned
by the Government to the special duty of protecting the justice
against the very parties, while in the actual prosecution of duties
assigned to him, without warrant, thereby leaving his charge without
the protection provided by the Government he was serving, at a time
when such protection seemed most needed. And, besides, the use of
the State police force beyond the limits of a county for the
protection of Justice Field would have been impracticable, as the
powers of the sheriff would have ended at its borders, and of other
township and city peace officers at the boundaries of their respective
townships and cities. Only a United States marshal or his deputy could
have exercised these official functions throughout the judicial
district, which embraces many counties. The only remedy suggested on
the part of the State was to arrest the deceased and hold him to bail
to keep the peace under section 706 of the Penal Code, the highest
limit of the amount of bail being $5,000. But although the threats are
conceded to have been publicly known in the State, no State officer
took any means to provide this flimsy safeguard. And the execution of
a bond in this amount to keep the peace would have had no effect in
deterring the intended assailants from the, commission of the offense
contemplated, when the penalties of the law would not deter them.

As to the deliberation and wisdom of Neagle's conduct under the
circumstances, the court, after stating the established facts,
concludes as follows: