zation, and binds her to the care of American destiny.
He also declares:
One of two courses seems to me absolutely necessary to be
followed--either bold and vigorous measures for annexation or a "customs
union," an ocean cable from the Californian coast to Honolulu, Pearl
Harbor perpetually ceded to the United States, with an implied but not
expressly stipulated American protectorate over the islands. I believe
the former to be the better, that which will prove much the more
advantageous to the islands and the cheapest and least embarrassing in
the end to the United States. If it was wise for the United States,
through Secretary Marcy, thirty-eight years ago, to offer to expend
$100,000 to secure a treaty of annexation, it certainly can not be
chimerical or unwise to expend $100,000 to secure annexation in the near
future. To-day the United States has five times the wealth she possessed
in 1854, and the reasons now existing for annexation are much stronger
than they were then. I can not refrain from expressing the opinion with
emphasis that the golden hour is near at hand.
These declarations certainly show a disposition and condition of mind
which may be usefully recalled when interpreting the significance of the
minister's conceded acts or when considering the probabilities of such
conduct on his part as may not be admitted.
In this view it seems proper to also quote from a letter written by the
minister to the Secretary of State on the 8th day of March, 1892, nearly
a year prior to the first step taken toward annexation. After stating
the possibility that the existing Government of Hawaii might be
overturned by an orderly and peaceful revolution, Minister Stevens
writes as follows:
Ordinarily, in like circumstances, the rule seems to be to limit the
landing and movement of United States forces in foreign waters and
dominion exclusively to the protection of the United States legation
and of the lives and property of American citizens; but as the relations
of the United States to Hawaii are exceptional, and in former years
the United States officials here took somewhat exceptional action in
circumstances of disorder, I desire to know how far the present minister
and naval commander may deviate from established international rules
and precedents in the contingencies indicated in the first part of this
dispatch.
To a minister of this temper, full of zeal
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