nded by my anxiety to do nothing
which would invite either harsh retaliation on the part of the Queen or
violence and bloodshed in any quarter. In the belief that the Queen,
as well as her enemies, would be willing to adopt such a course as
would meet these conditions, and in view of the fact that both the Queen
and the Provisional Government had at one time apparently acquiesced
in a reference of the entire case to the United States Government,
and considering the further fact that in any event the Provisional
Government by its own declared limitation was only "to exist until terms
of union with the United States of America have been negotiated and
agreed upon," I hoped that after the assurance to the members of that
Government that such union could not be consummated I might compass a
peaceful adjustment of the difficulty.

Actuated by these desires and purposes, and not unmindful of the
inherent perplexities of the situation nor of the limitations upon
my power, I instructed Minister Willis to advise the Queen and her
supporters of my desire to aid in the restoration of the status existing
before the lawless landing of the United States forces at Honolulu on
the 16th of January last if such restoration could be effected upon
terms providing for clemency as well as justice to all parties
concerned. The conditions suggested, as the instructions show,
contemplate a general amnesty to those concerned in setting up the
Provisional Government and a recognition of all its _bona fide_
acts and obligations. In short, they require that the past should be
buried and that the restored Government should reassume its authority as
if its continuity had not been interrupted. These conditions have not
proved acceptable to the Queen, and though she has been informed that
they will be insisted upon and that unless acceded to the efforts of the
President to aid in the restoration of her Government will cease, I have
not thus far learned that she is willing to yield them her acquiescence.
The check which my plans have thus encountered has prevented their
presentation to the members of the Provisional Government, while
unfortunate public misrepresentations of the situation and exaggerated
statements of the sentiments of our people have obviously injured the
prospects of successful Executive mediation.

I therefore submit this communication, with its accompanying exhibits,
embracing Mr. Blount's report, the evidence and statements taken b