i. 20; and like Diotrephes, mentioned
by St. John, 3 Epist. 9, 10. But in a society where all power must have
depended on the consent of those subject to it, how could any one
exercise a tyranny against the will of the majority, as well as against
the authority of the Apostles? And [Greek: ta prostassomena upo tou
plaethous] must signify, I think, "the bidding of the society at large."
Compare for this use of [Greek: plaethos], Ignatius, Smyrna. 8;
Trallian. 1, 8. A conjecture might be offered as to the solution of this
difficulty, but it would lead mo into too long a discussion.]

[Footnote 9: Insomuch that he wished all marriages to be solemnized with
the consent and approbation of the bishop, [Greek: meta gnomaes tou
episkopou], that they might be "according to God, and not according to
passion;" [Greek: kapa Theon kai mae kat epithomian].--_Ad.
Polycarp_. 5.]

On two points, however,--points not of detail, but of principle,--the
Scripture does seem to speak decisively. 1st. The whole body of the
church was to take an active share in its concerns; the various
faculties of its various members were to perform their several parts: it
was to be a living society, not an inert mass of mere hearers and
subjects, who were to be authoritatively taught and absolutely ruled by
one small portion of its members. It is quite consistent with this,
that, at particular times, the church should centre all its own power
and activity in the persons of its rulers. In the field, the imperium of
the Roman consul was unlimited; and even within the city walls, the
senate's commission in times of imminent danger, released him from all
restraints of law; the whole power of the state was, for the moment,
his, and his only. Such temporary despotisms are sometimes not expedient
merely, but necessary: without them society would perish. I do not,
therefore, regard Ignatius's epistles as really contradictory to the
idea of the church conveyed to us in the twelfth chapter of St. Paul's
First Epistle to the Corinthians: I believe that the dictatorship, so to
speak, which Ignatius claims for the bishop in each church, was required
by the circumstances of the case; but to change the temporary into the
perpetual dictatorship, was to subvert the Roman constitution; and to
make Ignatius's language the rule, instead of the exception, is no less
to subvert the Christian church. Wherever the language of Ignatius is
repeated with justice, there the church mus