deems subversive of the Constitution or of the vital interests of the
country, it is his solemn duty to stand in the breach and resist them.
The President is bound to approve or disapprove every bill which passes
Congress and is presented to him for his signature. The Constitution
makes this his duty, and he can not escape it if he would. He has no
election. In deciding upon any bill presented to him he must exercise
his own best judgment. If he can not approve, the Constitution commands
him to return the bill to the House in which it originated with his
objections, and if he fail to do this within ten days (Sundays excepted)
it shall become a law without his signature. Right or wrong, he may be
overruled by a vote of two-thirds of each House, and in that event the
bill becomes a law without his sanction. If his objections be not thus
overruled, the subject is only postponed, and is referred to the States
and the people for their consideration and decision. The President's
power is negative merely, and not affirmative. He can enact no law. The
only effect, therefore, of his withholding his approval of a bill passed
by Congress is to suffer the existing laws to remain unchanged, and the
delay occasioned is only that required to enable the States and the
people to consider and act upon the subject in the election of public
agents who will carry out their wishes and instructions. Any attempt to
coerce the President to yield his sanction to measures which he can not
approve would be a violation of the spirit of the Constitution, palpable
and flagrant, and if successful would break down the independence of the
executive department and make the President, elected by the people and
clothed by the Constitution with power to defend their rights, the mere
instrument of a majority of Congress. A surrender on his part of the
powers with which the Constitution has invested his office would effect
a practical alteration of that instrument without resorting to the
prescribed process of amendment.

With the motives or considerations which may induce Congress to pass any
bill the President can have nothing to do. He must presume them to be as
pure as his own, and look only to the practical effect of their measures
when compared with the Constitution or the public good.

But it has been urged by those who object to the exercise of this
undoubted constitutional power that it assails the representative
principle and the capacity of the peo