y any duty of tonnage." With the "consent" of Congress, such
duties may be levied, collected, and expended by the States. We are not
left in the dark as to the objects of this reservation of power to the
States. The subject was fully considered by the Convention that framed
the Constitution. It appears in Mr. Madison's report of the proceedings
of that body that one object of the reservation was that the States
should not be restrained from laying duties of tonnage for the purpose
of clearing harbors. Other objects were named in the debates, and among
them the support of seamen. Mr. Madison, treating on this subject in the
Federalist, declares that--

The restraint on the power of the States over imports and exports is
enforced by all the arguments which prove the necessity of submitting
the regulation of trade to the Federal councils. It is needless,
therefore, to remark further on this head than that the manner in which
the restraint is qualified seems well calculated at once to secure to
the States a reasonable discretion in providing for the conveniency of
their imports and exports, and to the United States a reasonable check
against the abuse of this discretion.

The States may lay tonnage duties for clearing harbors, improving
rivers, or for other purposes, but are restrained from abusing the
power, because before such duties can take effect the "consent" of
Congress must be obtained. Here is a safe provision for the improvement
of harbors and rivers in the reserved powers of the States and in the
aid they may derive from duties of tonnage levied with the consent of
Congress. Its safeguards are, that both the State legislatures and
Congress have to concur in the act of raising the funds; that they are
in every instance to be levied upon the commerce of those ports which
are to profit by the proposed improvement; that no question of
conflicting power or jurisdiction is involved; that the expenditure,
being in the hands of those who are to pay the money and be immediately
benefited, will be more carefully managed and more productive of good
than if the funds were drawn from the National Treasury and disbursed by
the officers of the General Government; that such a system will carry
with it no enlargement of Federal power and patronage, and leave the
States to be the sole judges of their own wants and interests, with only
a conservative negative in Congress upon any abuse of the power which
the Stat