tem strictly within the revenue
standard will place the manufacturing interests on a stable footing and
inure to their permanent advantage, while it will as nearly as may be
practicable extend to all the great interests of the country the
incidental protection which can be afforded by our revenue laws. Such a
system, when once firmly established, would be permanent, and not be
subject to the constant complaints, agitations, and changes which must
ever occur when duties are not laid for revenue, but for the "protection
merely" of a favored interest.
In the deliberations of Congress on this subject it is hoped that a
spirit of mutual concession and compromise between conflicting interests
may prevail, and that the result of their labors may be crowned with the
happiest consequences.
By the Constitution of the United States it is provided that "no money
shall be drawn from the Treasury but in consequence of appropriations
made by law." A public treasury was undoubtedly contemplated and
intended to be created, in which the public money should be kept from
the period of collection until needed for public uses. In the collection
and disbursement of the public money no agencies have ever been employed
by law except such as were appointed by the Government, directly
responsible to it and under its control. The safe-keeping of the public
money should be confided to a public treasury created by law and under
like responsibility and control. It is not to be imagined that the
framers of the Constitution could have intended that a treasury should
be created as a place of deposit and safe-keeping of the public money
which was irresponsible to the Government. The first Congress under the
Constitution, by the act of the 2d of September, 1789, "to establish the
Treasury Department," provided for the appointment of a Treasurer, and
made it his duty "to receive and keep the moneys of the United States"
and "at all times to submit to the Secretary of the Treasury and the
Comptroller, or either of them, the inspection of the moneys in his
hands."
That banks, national or State, could not have been intended to be used
as a substitute for the Treasury spoken of in the Constitution as
keepers of the public money is manifest from the fact that at that time
there was no national bank, and but three or four State banks, of
limited capital, existed in the country. Their employment as
depositories was at first resorted to to a limited extent,
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