sidered himself to
have a clear and adequate conception of God. But by this he meant only
that, as a philosopher, he had an intuitive certainty of eternal and
infinite Being. So have all of us humbler mortals, though we should not
have been able to express it for ourselves. No one supposes that for an
indefinite space of time or eternity there was nothing, and then
suddenly there was something. But, if not, then everyone recognises with
Spinoza the fact of eternal Being, though, of course, he saw what this
recognition meant, as the many do not. But when it comes to the facts of
mortal imperfections and ignorance, Spinoza, with his theory of
"inadequate ideas," is as ready as Spencer to acknowledge the
Unknowable.]

[Footnote 18: I do not think it necessary in an essay of this kind to
discuss Spinoza's theory of the body as object of the mind, and the mind
as "idea" of the body, both being different aspects of the same thing.]

[Footnote 19: "Rei alicujus singularis actu existentis." The word
"divine" does not occur in Prop. xi. Ethices II., from which I quote.
But it is implied; because the mind is only a mode or modification of
the infinite attribute of thought, which again expresses the eternal
Substance in God. I venture a doubt whether "actually existing," though
adopted by such authorities as Sir F. Pollock gives, with any
distinctness, Spinoza's meaning. I may be wrong, but I suspect that one
of the later uses of "actus," as quoted in Ducange, affected Spinoza's
Latinity. Thus several ecclesiastical writers are quoted as using the
word in the sense of office, or function. Surely this would suit
Spinoza's definition of the mind. For he treats it as a centre of
phenomenal activity amidst the infinite modes of the divine attribute.
Its apparent individuality is a consequence of its spontaneity as a
centre of action--always understood that the spontaneity is consistent
with the absolute eternal order assumed throughout the work.]

[Footnote 20: Of course the professor of optics can tell us how many
vibrations in a second go to produce the particular shade of colour. But
these cannot by any means be identified with conscious perception; and
it is with this only that we are concerned.]

[Footnote 21: Ethices Pars II., Prop. xi. Corollarium. "Hence it follows
that the human mind is part of the infinite intellect (thought) of God;
and accordingly, when we say that the human mind perceives this or that,
we only say tha