the lines
upon which movement will take place.[1]

[Footnote 1: _Chance_ plays so great a part in all human affairs that
when a man tries to ward off a remote danger by present sacrifice, the
danger often vanishes under some new and unforeseen development of
events; and then the sacrifice, in addition to being a complete loss,
brings about such an altered state of things as to be in itself a
source of positive danger in the face of this new development. In
taking measures of precaution, then, it is well not to look too far
ahead, but to reckon with chance; and often to oppose a courageous
front to a danger, in the hope that, like many a dark thunder-cloud,
it may pass away without breaking.]

But people generally think that present circumstances will last, and
that matters will go on in the future as they have clone in the past.
Their mistakes arises from the fact that they do not understand the
cause of the things they see--causes which, unlike the effects they
produce, contain in themselves the germ of future change. The
effects are all that people know, and they hold fast to them on the
supposition that those unknown causes, which were sufficient to bring
them about, will also be able to maintain them as they are. This is a
very common error; and the fact that it is common is not without its
advantage, for it means that people always err in unison; and hence
the calamity which results from the error affects all alike, and is
therefore easy to bear; whereas, if a philosopher makes a mistake, he
is alone in his error, and so at a double disadvantage.[1]

[Footnote 1: I may remark, parenthetically, that all this is a
confirmation of the principle laid down in _Die Welt als Wille und
Vorstellung_ (Bk. I. p. 94: 4th edit.), that error always consists in
making _a wrong inference_, that is, in ascribing a given effect to
something that did not cause it.]

But in saying that we should anticipate the effects of time, I mean
that we should mentally forecast what they are likely to be; I do
not mean that we should practically forestall them, by demanding the
immediate performance of promises which time alone can fulfill. The
man who makes his demand will find out that there is no worse or more
exacting usurer than Time; and that, if you compel Time to give money
in advance, you will have to pay a rate of interest more ruinous than
any Jew would require. It is possible, for instance, to make a tree
burst forth into leaf,