r not only were
the industrial establishments kept going, but their production of
aeronautical requirements relieved those organisations devoted to the
manufacture of armaments, so that the whole resources and facilities of
these could be concentrated upon the supply of munitions of war.

In France the air-fleet, although extensive upon the outbreak of war,
was somewhat heterogeneous. Experiment was still being pursued: no type
had met with definite official recognition, the result being that
no arrangements had been completed for the production of one or more
standard types upon an elaborate scale comparable with that maintained
by Germany. In fact some six months after the outbreak of war there was
an appreciable lack of precision on this point in French military.
Many of the types which had established their success were forbidden by
military decree as mentioned in a previous chapter, while manufacturing
arrangements were still somewhat chaotic.

Great Britain was still more backward in the new movement. But this
state of affairs was in a measure due to the division of the Fourth Arm
among the two services. A well-organised Government manufactory for
the production of aeroplanes and other aircraft necessities had been
established, while the private manufacturers had completed preparations
for wholesale production. But it was not until the Admiralty accepted
responsibility for the aerial service that work was essayed in grim
earnest.

The allocation of the aerial responsibilities of Great Britain to
the Admiralty was a wise move. Experience has revealed the advantages
accruing from the perfection of homogeneous squadrons upon the water,
that is to say groups of ships which are virtually sister-craft of
identical speed, armament, and so on, thus enabling the whole to act
together as a complete effective unit. As this plan had proved so
successful upon the water, the Admiralty decided to apply it to the
fleet designed for service in the air above.

At the time this plan of campaign was definitely settled Great Britain
as an aerial power was a long way behind her most formidable rival, but
strenuous efforts were made to reduce the handicap, and within a
short while the greater part of this leeway had been made up. Upon the
outbreak of war Great Britain undoubtedly was inferior to Germany
in point of numbers of aircraft, but the latter Power was completely
outclassed in efficiency, and from the point of view of PERSON