ciably reduced by greater care among
the aviators in handling their vessels.

The fast vessels of the French aerial fleet have proved exceptionally
valuable. With these craft speeds of 95 and 100 miles or more per hour
have been attained under favourable conditions, and pace has proved
distinctly advantageous, inasmuch as it gives the French aviators a
superiority of about 40 per cent over the average German machine. It
was the activity and daring of the French fliers upon these high speed
machines which induced the German airmen to change their tactics.
Individual effort and isolated raiding operations were abandoned in
favour of what might be described as combined or squadron attack. Six
or eight machines advancing together towards the French lines somewhat
nonplussed these fleet French mosquito craft, and to a certain degree
nullified their superiority in pace. Speed was discounted, for the
simple reason that the enemy when so massed evinced a disposition to
fight and to follow harassing tactics when one of the slowest French
machines ventured into the air.

It is interesting to observe that aerial operations, now that they are
being conducted upon what may be termed methodical lines as distinct
from corsair movements, are following the broad fundamental principles
of naval tactics. Homogeneous squadrons, that is, squadrons composed
of vessels of similar type and armament, put out and follow roughly
the "single line ahead" formation. Upon sighting the enemy there is the
manoeuvring for position advantage which must accrue to the speedier
protagonist. One then, witnesses what might almost be described as an
application of the process of capping the line or "crossing the 'T.'"
This tends to throw the slower squadron into confusion by bending it
back upon itself, meanwhile exposing it to a demoralizing fire.

The analogy is not precisely correct but sufficiently so to indicate
that aerial battles will be fought much upon the same lines, as
engagements between vessels upon the water. If the manoeuvres accomplish
nothing beyond breaking up and scattering the foe, the result is
satisfactory in as much as in this event it is possible to exert a
driving tendency and to force him back upon the lines of the superior
force, when the scattered vessels may be brought within the zone of
spirited fire from the ground.

Attacks in force are more likely to prove successful than individual
raiding tactics, as recent events upon th