saved it from
half-hearted and half-minded patronage.

So that, on the best showing, we are to take "Agnostic" on the professed
ground that it is more exact than "Atheism," but on the real ground that
it is less unpopular, waiting meanwhile for the time when it shall have
become more exact than it is by becoming accepted in the same sense as
the Atheism that has previously been rejected. Courage and
straightforwardness saves a lot of trouble.

Mr. Bailey Saunders (_Quest of Faith_, p. 7) calls agnosticism "a plea
on behalf of suspended judgment," and this is a favourite expression.
It gives one an air of impartiality, with the comforting reflection that
it will please the socially stronger side. But suspended judgment on
what? To hold one's judgment in suspense implies that we have at least a
workable comprehension of the subject in dispute, and that judgment is
suspended because the evidence produced is not adequate to command
decision. But is that the case here? Does the Agnostic claim that the
evidence produced by the theist is merely inadequate, or that it is
irrelevant? Surely he holds the latter position. And if that is the
case, then he does not suspend judgment, for the simple reason that
there is no case made out concerning which judgment is to be suspended.
There is simply no case before the court. For the Agnostic, no more than
the Atheist, can attach no intelligible meaning to "God." He must have
it defined to understand it, and when it is defined he rejects it
without ceremony. And it is quite obvious that when an Agnostic says, "I
know nothing about God," he means more than that; otherwise it would not
be worth the saying. He really means that no one else knows either. He
asserts that a knowledge of god is impossible to anyone, because it does
not present the possibility of being known. "God," standing alone is a
meaningless word, and how can one suspend judgment concerning the truth
of an unintelligible proposition?

For here are the plain facts of the situation. If we ask the Agnostic
whether he suspends judgment concerning the existence of the gods of any
savage peoples, the reply is in the negative. If we put the same
question concerning the god of the Bible, or of the Mohammedan, or of
any other of the world's theologies we receive the same answer. There is
nothing here to suspend judgment about, the characters and qualities of
the gods being such that there admits of no doubt as to their ima