State law
refuse the exercise of the right to the negro, your error of
judgment, however conscientious, shall subject you to fine
and imprisonment. I do not apprehend that the conflicting
legislation which the bill seems to contemplate is so likely
to occur as to render it necessary at this time to adopt a
measure of such doubtful constitutionality.
"In the next place, this provision of the bill seems to be
unnecessary, as adequate judicial remedies could be adopted
to secure the desired end without invading the immunities of
legislators, always important to be preserved in the
interest of public liberty; without assailing the
independence of the judiciary, always essential to the
preservation of individual rights; and without impairing the
efficiency of ministerial officers, always necessary for the
maintenance of public peace and order. The remedy proposed
by this section seems to be, in this respect, not only
anomalous, but unconstitutional; for the Constitution
guarantees nothing with certainty, if it does not insure to
the several States the right of making and executing laws in
regard to all matters arising within their jurisdiction,
subject only to the restriction that, in cases of conflict
with the Constitution and constitutional laws of the United
States, the latter should be held to be the supreme law of
the land.
"The third section gives the district courts of the United
States exclusive 'cognizance of all crimes and offenses
committed against the provisions of this act,' and
concurrent jurisdiction with the circuit courts of the
United States of all civil and criminal cases 'affecting
persons who are denied or can not enforce in the courts or
judicial tribunals of the State or locality where they may
be any of the rights secured to them by the first section.'
The construction which I have given to the second section is
strengthened by this third section, for it makes clear what
kind of denial or deprivation of the rights secured by the
first section was in contemplation. It is a denial or
deprivation of such rights 'in the courts or judicial
tribunals of the State.' It stands, therefore, clear of
doubt, that the offense and the penalties provided in the
second section are intended for the State judge, who
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