ty are complete. It seems miraculous that its writer
should have become, as he did, master of a concise and nervous style
when once his words became the complement of his deeds.
[Footnote 22: These phrases may nearly all be found in
the notes which he had taken or jottings he had made
while reading Voltaire and Rousseau: Napoleon inconnu,
II, 209-292.]
The second cause for Buonaparte's delay in returning to France on the
expiration of his furlough was his political and military ambition.
This was suddenly quenched by the receipt of news that the Assembly at
Paris would not create the longed-for National Guard, nor the ministry
lend itself to any plan for circumventing the law. It was, therefore,
evident that every chance of becoming Paoli's lieutenant was finally
gone. By the advice of the president himself, therefore, Buonaparte
determined to withdraw once more to France and to await results.
Corsica was still distracted. A French official sent by the war
department just at this time to report on its condition is not sparing
of the language he uses to denounce the independent feeling and
anti-French sympathies of the people. "The Italian," he says,
"acquiesces, but does not forgive; an ambitious man keeps no faith,
and estimates his life by his power." The agent further describes the
Corsicans as so accustomed to unrest by forty years of anarchy that
they would gladly seize the first occasion to throw off the domination
of laws which restrain the social disorder. The Buonaparte faction,
enumerated with the patriot brigand Zampaglini at their head, he calls
"despicable creatures," "ruined in reputation and credit."
It would be hard to find a higher compliment to Paoli and his friends,
considering the source from which these words emanated. They were all
poor and they were all in debt. Even now, in the age of reform, they
saw their most cherished plans thwarted by the presence in every town
of garrisons composed of officers and men who, though long resident
in the island, and attached to its people by many ties, were
nevertheless conservative in their feelings, and, by the instinct of
their tradition and discipline, devoted to the still powerful official
bureaus not yet destroyed by the Revolution. To replace these by a
well-organized and equipped National Guard was now the most ardent
wish of all patriots. There was nothing unworthy in Napoleon's longing
for
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