ineers to accept the lieutenant-colonelcy of
a cavalry regiment. When the civil war became certain, a Virginian by
birth, he left the position of Quartermaster-General of the United States,
and offered his sword to the Confederacy. To the East, as his great
namesake Albert Sidney to the West, he was "the rose and fair expectancy"
of our cause; and his timely march from Patterson's front in the Valley
to assist Beauregard at Manassas confirmed public opinion of his capacity.
Yet he cannot be said to have proved a fortunate commander. Leaving out
of view Bentonville and the closing scenes in North Carolina, which were
rather the spasmodic efforts of despair than regular military movements,
General Johnston's "offensive" must be limited to Seven Pines or Fair Oaks.
Here his plan was well considered and singularly favored of fortune. Some
two corps of McClellan's army were posted on the southwest or Richmond side
of the Chickahominy, and a sudden rise of that stream swept away bridges
and overflowed the adjacent lowlands, cutting off these corps from their
supports. They ought to have been crushed, but Johnston fell, severely
wounded; upon which confusion ensued, and no results of importance were
attained. Official reports fail, most unwisely, to fix the responsibility
of the failure, and I do not desire to add to the gossip prevailing then
and since.

From his own account of the war we can gather that Johnston regrets he
did not fight on the Oostenaula, after Polk had joined him. It appears
that in a council two of his three corps commanders, Polk, Hardee, and
Hood, were opposed to fighting there; but to call a council at all was a
weakness not to be expected of a general of Johnston's ability and
self-reliant nature.

I have written of him as a master of logistics, and his skill in
handling troops was great. As a retreat, the precision and coolness of
his movements during the Georgia campaign would have enhanced the
reputation of Moreau; but it never seems to have occurred to him to
assume the offensive during the many turning movements of his flanks,
movements involving time and distance. Dispassionate reflection would
have brought him to the conclusion that Lee was even more overweighted
in Virginia than he in Georgia; that his Government had given him every
available man, only leaving small garrisons at Wilmington, Charleston,
Savannah, and Mobile; that Forrest's command in Mississippi, operating
on Sherman's communic