loyed. The United States had
never possessed a great army. The entire force engaged in the war
against Mexico would scarcely have made a respectable _corps d'armee_,
and to study the organization of great armies and campaigns a recurrence
to the Napoleonic era was necessary. The Governments of Europe for a
half century had been improving armaments, and changing the tactical
unit of formation and manoeuvre to correspond to such improvement. The
Italian campaign of Louis Napoleon established some advance in field
artillery, but the supreme importance of breech-loaders was not admitted
until Sadowa, in 1866. All this must be considered in determining the
value of McClellan's work. Taking the raw material intrusted to him, he
converted it into a great military machine, complete in all its parts,
fitted for its intended purpose. Moreover, he resisted the natural
impatience of his Government and people, and the follies of politicians
and newspapers, and for months refused to put his machine at work before
all its delicate adjustments were perfected. Thus, much in its own
despite, the North obtained armies and the foundation of success. The
correctness of the system adopted by McClellan proved equal to all
emergencies, and remained unchanged until the close of the war.
Disappointed in his hands, and suffering painful defeats in those of his
immediate successors, the "Army of the Potomac" always recovered, showed
itself a vital organism, and finally triumphed. McClellan organized
victory for his section, and those who deem the preservation of the
"Union" the first of earthly duties should not cease to do him
reverence.

I have here written of McClellan, not as a leader, but an organizer of
armies; and as such he deserves to rank with the Von Moltkes,
Scharnhorsts, and Louvois of history.

Constant struggle against the fatal interference of politicians with his
military plans and duties separated McClellan from the civil department
of his Government, and led him to adopt a policy of his own. The
military road to Richmond, and the only one as events proved, was by the
peninsula and the James river, and it was his duty so to advise. He
insisted, and had his way; but not for long. A little of that
selfishness which serves lower intelligences as an instinct of
self-preservation would have shown him that his most dangerous enemies
were not in his front. The Administration at Washington had to deal with
a people blind with rage, an