the
continuation of the insecurity of peace. Both
admit that the proposed League of the Nations has
become a necessity; both admit that it might
indeed protect mankind against new wars and a
state of incessantly endangered peace. Why then
wait and let the disaster go on instead of
proceeding at once to lay the foundation of this
League?

The step is not so impossible as it might appear.
Supposing one neutral state took the matter in
hand and, after having ascertained the consent of
the other neutrals or at least a majority of
them--which it is almost sure to obtain--would
invite all the nations, the belligerents included,
to a conference or a congress at a neutral place
for the discussion and the arrangement of the
principles and rules of the proposed League of the
Nations. Would the belligerent nations refuse to
send their delegates to such a conference? Could
they do it without damaging their case before the
world of the neutrals and the masses of their own
people? It is most improbable that they would do
such a thing. And even if they did they would not
by this put the conference to naught. It would be
there and would give palpable substance to an idea
which until now lived, in spite of great and most
ingenuous work spent on it, politically only in
the sphere of lofty speculation or projects.

And the conference could do more. Starting from
the maxim which finds such impressive accentuation
in President Wilson's note that war in general
must not, and the present war in particular can
not, be regarded as the private affair of the
individual states that engage in it, the
conference could also take into consideration some
questions of consequence connected with the
present war. It could, e.g., whilst laying the
foundations for the security of countries against
wilful attacks lay down opinions about the just
settlement of disputed questions of nationality
and the liberation of nations or part of such from
allegiance to a state or empire of different or
mixed nationalities. It seems to become a
necessity to make clear whether a Power or
coalition of such can be justified to put in the
list of their war aims the liberation of
nationalities without sufficient proof that the
l