Macedonians; his numerous writings deal with all branches of science
known to his times; the first edition of the Greek text, that of Aldus
Manutius, published in 1495-98.[74]

I

WHAT THINGS ARE PLEASANT[75]

Let it be laid down by us, that pleasure is a certain motion of the
soul, and a settlement of it, at once rapid and perceptible, into its
own proper nature; and that pain is the contrary. If then pleasure be
a thing of this nature, it is plain that whatever is productive of the
disposition I have described is pleasant; while everything of a
nature to destroy it, or produce a disposition the opposite to it, is
painful.

Generally speaking, therefore, it is necessary, both that the being in
progress toward a state conformable to nature should be pleasant; and
that, in the highest degree, when those feelings, whose original is
conformable to it, shall have recovered that their nature; and habits,
because that which is habitual becomes by that time natural, as it
were; for, in a certain way, custom is like nature, because the idea
of frequency is proximate to that of always; now nature belongs to the
idea of always, custom to that of often. What is not compulsory, also,
is pleasant; for compulsion is contrary to nature. Wherefore acts of
necessity are painful; and it has been truly remarked, "Every act of
necessity is in its nature painful." It must be also that a state of
sedulous attention, anxiety, the having the mind on the stretch, are
painful, for they all are acts of necessity, and constrained, unless
they have become habitual; but it is custom which, under such
circumstances, renders them pleasant. The contraries of these must
also be pleasant; wherefore, relaxation of mind, leisure,
listlessness, amusements, and intervals of rest, rank in the class of
things pleasant; for none of these has anything to do with necessity.
Everything of which there is an innate appetite, is pleasant; for
appetite is a desire of what is pleasant.

Now, of appetites, some are irrational, others attended by reason. I
call all those irrational which men desire, not from any conception
which they form: of this kind are all which are said to exist
naturally, as those of the body; thirst or hunger, for instance, in
the case of sustenance; and the appetite of sustenance in every kind.
And the appetites connected with objects of taste, and of lust, and,
in fact, objects of touch generally; the appetite of fragrant odors,
t