ose who enjoy the best
government will live best according to existing circumstances; he
ought, therefore, first to come to some agreement as to the manner of
life which, so to speak, is most desirable for all; and afterward,
whether this life is the same or different in the individual and the
member of a state.

Deeming then that we have already sufficiently shown what sort of life
is best, in our popular discourses on that subject, we must now make
use of what we there said. Certainly no one ever called in question
the propriety of one of the divisions; namely, that as there are three
kinds of things good for man, which are, what is external, what
belongs to the body, and to the soul, it is evident that all these
must conspire to make men truly happy. For no one would say that a man
was happy who had nothing of fortitude or temperance, justice or
prudence, but was afraid of the flies that flew round him; or who
would abstain from nothing, if he chanced to be desirous of meat or
drink, or who would murder his dearest friend for a farthing; or, in
like manner, one who was in every particular as wanting and misguided
in his understanding as an infant or a maniac. These truths are so
evident that all must agree to them, tho some may dispute about the
quantity and the degree: for they may think, that a very little amount
of virtue is sufficient for happiness; but as to riches, property,
power, honor, and all such things, they endeavor to increase them
without bounds. But to such we say, that it is easy to prove, from
what experience teaches us concerning these cases, that it is not
through these external goods that men acquire virtue, but through
virtue that they acquire them. As to a happy life, whether it is to be
found in pleasure or in virtue, or in both, certain it is that it
belongs more frequently to those whose morals are most pure, and whose
understandings are best cultivated, and who preserve moderation in
the acquisition of external goods, than to those who possess a
sufficiency of external good things, but are deficient in the rest.

And that such is the case will be clearly seen by any one who views
the matter with reflection. For whatsoever is external has its
boundary, as a machine; and whatsoever is useful is such that its
excess is either necessarily hurtful, or at best useless to the
possessor. But every good quality of the soul, the higher it is in
degree, becomes much the more useful, if it is permitt