have been" adopted, regardless of all military
rules. The trite saying that "nothing succeeds like success" should be
supplemented by adding, "and nothing more reprehensive than failure." In
military operations success or defeat are in the scales, and the least
little occurrence is liable to outbalance the other. No matter how
carefully a commanding officer may lay his plans, or how minutely he may
explain them to his staff and subordinates, if one does not do his part
in promptly carrying out instructions at the proper moment, the whole
machinery is thrown out of gear, and failure is the inevitable result.

In the first place, while Gen. Napier's plan of campaign was excellent
in itself, there were several very important things omitted that were
essential to its success. That of the greatest importance was the lack
of proper provision being made for obtaining information of the exact
position and movements of the enemy, such as a corps of competent scouts
could have given. That omission is fatal to the success of any military
movement. Again, those who were in command of columns on the 2nd of June
do not seem to have had an intelligent idea of the country they were
about to move over, and had to rely on whatever chance information they
could obtain, much of which, in the excited state of the minds of
the people, was unreliable. To condemn any particular officer for an
unlooked-for disaster is a serious matter, unless such defeat is clearly
the result of his own negligence, or some movement of which he had
personal control. Therefore critics should always be careful to put the
saddle of blame on the right horse.

As Col. Peacocke had been assigned to the immediate command of the
troops operating on the Niagara frontier by Gen. Napier, it will be
noted (as related in a former chapter) that he arrived at Chippawa on
the evening of June 1st, with a considerable number of regular troops
and a complete battery of field guns, manned by experienced gunners of
the Royal Artillery. His reinforcements from Toronto and St. Catharines
were closely following, and quickly available. That night he sent Capt.
Akers across the country with definite orders to Lieut.-Col. Booker to
move eastward to Ridgeway by rail at 5 o'clock the next morning, and
effect a junction with his (Col. Peacocke's) column at Stevensville at
10 o'clock. These instructions stated that Col. Peacocke would leave
Chippawa at 6 a.m., and in accordance with this prog