t seems that it was his
original intention to cross the Euphrates into Mesopotamia, and thus to
advance almost in the footsteps of Crassus but when he reached the banks
of the river (about midsummer B.C. 37) he found such preparations
made to resist him that he abandoned his first design, and, turning
northwards, entered Armenia, determined to take advantage of his
alliance with Artavasdes, and to attack Parthia with Armenia as the
basis of his operations. Artavasdes gladly received him, and persuaded
him, instead of penetrating into Parthia itself, to direct his arms
against the territory of a Parthian subject-ally, the king of Media
Atropatene, whose territories adjoined Armenia on the southeast.
Artavasdes pointed out that the Median monarch was absent from his own
country, having joined his troops to those which Phraates had collected
for the defence of Parthia. His territory therefore would be open to
ravage, and even Praaspa, his capital, might prove an easy prey. The
prospect excited Antony, who at once divided his troops, and having
given orders to Oppius Statianus to follow him leisurely with the more
unwieldy part of the army, the baggage-train, and the siege batteries,
proceeded himself by forced marches to Praaspa with all the calvary and
the infantry of the better class. This town was situated at the distance
of nearly three hundred miles from the Armenian frontier; but the way
to it lay through well-cultivated plains, where food and water were
abundant. Antony performed the march without difficulty and at once
invested the place. The walls were strong, and the defenders numerous,
so that he made little impression; and when the Median king returned,
accompanied by his Parthian suzerain, to the defence of his country, the
capital seemed in so little danger that it was resolved to direct the
first attack on Statianus, who had not yet joined his chief. A most
successful onslaught was made on this officer, who was surprised,
defeated, and slain. Ten thousand Romans fell in the battle, and all the
baggage-wagons and engines of war were taken. A still worse result of
the defeat was the desertion of Aitavasdes, who, regarding the case of
the Romans as desperate, drew off his troops, and left Antony to his own
resources.

The Roman general now found himself in great difficulties. He had
exhausted the immediate neighborhood of Praaspa, and was obliged to send
his foraging-parties on distant expeditions, where, being