ss, in a long letter to the Honorable William
Eustis, the secretary of war at Washington, said: "I have been informed
by Colonel Findley, who saw the return of the quartermaster-general the
day after the surrender, that their whole force, of every description,
white, red, and black, was 1,030.[72] They had twenty-nine platoons,
twelve in a platoon, of men dressed in uniform. Many of these were
evidently Canadian militia. The rest of their militia increased their
white force to about 700. The number of Indians could not be ascertained
with any degree of precision--not many were visible. And in the event of
an attack upon the town and fort, it was a species of force which could
have afforded no material advantage to the enemy.... That we were far
superior to the enemy, that upon any ordinary principles of calculation
we would have defeated them, the wounded and indignant feelings of every
man there will testify.... I was informed by General Hull, the morning
after the capitulation, that the British forces consisted of 1,800
regulars, and that he surrendered to prevent the effusion of human
blood. That he magnified their regular force nearly five-fold, there can
be no doubt. Whether the philanthropic reason assigned by him is a
sufficient justification for surrendering a fortified town, an army, and
a territory, is for the government to determine. Confident I am, that
had the courage and conduct of the general been equal to the spirit and
zeal of the troops, the event would have been brilliant and successful
as it is now disastrous and dishonorable." Hull's behaviour, then, can
only be accounted for by the supposition that the boldness of his
adversary's movements led him to believe he had to contend with far
greater numbers; or, that having threatened to refuse quarter to the
white man found fighting by the side of the Indian, he was
apprehensive, in the event of defeat, that this threat would be visited
with severe retaliation, particularly by the Indians, whose fury, in a
successful assault, it might have been very difficult to restrain. To
their honor, however, be it said, that although they took a few
prisoners on the advance, the enemy sustained no loss of life beyond
that caused by the British batteries; and in general orders, at Detroit,
they were told, that in nothing could they testify more strongly their
love to the king, their great father, than in following the dictates of
honor and humanity by which they had hi
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