anxious to accommodate the differences between the two
countries; but _after_ the American government had refused to continue
the armistice, it appears to us that Sir George Prevost was pursuing a
suicidal course, as to wait for the enemy till he shall have prepared
his forces and passed your frontiers, to plunder your towns and occupy
your country, is a very recent expedient recognized by no government,
and practised by no people of ancient or modern times. But
notwithstanding the delay caused by the armistice, the proposed attack
could still have been carried into effect after its cessation; and it
was only relinquished by express orders from the commander-in-chief. We
seek not to impugn his motives, as they probably originated in a
mistaken sense of duty, and evidently from an impression that to attack
the Americans again on their own frontier would be to render the contest
more popular among them. It was under this impression that, in a general
order[88] issued at Montreal on the 31st of August, the
commander-in-chief was weak enough to offer an indirect apology to the
American people for the invasion of their territory at Detroit. Whether
this continued defensive policy was such as, under all the
circumstances, ought to have been observed, we leave it to others to
determine; but certainly the result did not justify its expediency, and
the tree is usually judged of by its fruit. Forbearance in war, where
success is probable, strikes us as a positive evil that a very doubtful
good may ensue--it is seldom properly appreciated; and the
governor-general appears to have seen his error when too late, as in the
following year he was himself ignobly foiled in an attack on Sackett's
Harbour. We cannot understand why the attack under Sir George Prevost,
in May, 1813, was more politic than it would have been in September the
year preceding, under Major-General Brock; and although Captain Glegg
met with a very chilling reception from the former officer, yet we would
willingly acquit him of any jealous feeling where such important
interests were at stake. At the same time it is due to the memory of
this unfortunate officer to add, that his civil administration was as
able as his military one in Canada was inglorious; and that although his
conduct as a soldier was on more than one occasion the subject of much
and just animadversion in England, yet he acquired the warm attachment
of the French Canadians, who speak highly of him to