ed, remarking incidentally that he should be starved out in a few
days. At 3.20 A.M., on April 12, Beauregard notified Anderson that he
should open fire in one hour. That morning the occupants of Sumter, 9
commissioned officers, 68 non-commissioned officers and privates, 8
musicians, and 43 laborers, breakfasted on pork and water, the last
rations in the fort. Before daybreak the Confederate batteries were
pouring shot and shell against the walls. Response was made from as many
guns as the small body of defenders could handle. But the fort was more
easily damaged than were the works on the mainland, and on the morning
of the 13th, the officers' quarters having caught fire, and the magazine
being so imperiled that it had to be closed and covered with earth, the
fort became untenable. Early in the evening terms of capitulation were
agreed upon.
Meantime three transports of the relief expedition were lying outside
the bar. The first arrived shortly before the bombardment began, the
other two came only a trifle later. All day long these vessels lay to,
wondering why the Powhatan did not appear. Had she been there upon the
critical night of the 12th, the needed supplies could have been thrown
into the fort, for the weather was so dark that the rebel patrol was
useless, and it was actually believed in Charleston that the relief had
been accomplished. But the Powhatan was far away steaming at full speed
for Pensacola. For this sad blunder Lincoln generously, but fairly
enough, took the blame to himself. The only excuse which has ever been
advanced in behalf of Mr. Lincoln is that he allowed himself to be led
blindfold through this important business by Mr. Seward, and that he
signed such papers as the secretary of state presented to him without
learning their purport and bearing. But such an excuse, even if it can
be believed, seems fully as bad as the blunder which it is designed to
palliate.
Other blame also has been laid upon Lincoln on the ground that he was
dilatory in reaching the determination to relieve the fort. That the
decision should have been reached and the expedition dispatched more
promptly is entirely evident; but whether or not Lincoln was in fault is
quite another question. Three facts are to be considered: 1. The highest
military authority in the country advised him, a civilian, that
evacuation was a necessity. 2. Most of his ministers were at first
against reinforcement, and they never unanimously recom
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