le privilege of being tried by their country. [201] 1. The
administration of justice is the most ancient office of a prince: it was
exercised by the Roman kings, and abused by Tarquin; who alone, without
law or council, pronounced his arbitrary judgments. The first consuls
succeeded to this regal prerogative; but the sacred right of appeal soon
abolished the jurisdiction of the magistrates, and all public causes
were decided by the supreme tribunal of the people. But a wild
democracy, superior to the forms, too often disdains the essential
principles, of justice: the pride of despotism was envenomed by plebeian
envy, and the heroes of Athens might sometimes applaud the happiness of
the Persian, whose fate depended on the caprice of a single tyrant. Some
salutary restraints, imposed by the people or their own passions,
were at once the cause and effect of the gravity and temperance of the
Romans. The right of accusation was confined to the magistrates.

A vote of the thirty five tribes could inflict a fine; but the
cognizance of all capital crimes was reserved by a fundamental law to
the assembly of the centuries, in which the weight of influence
and property was sure to preponderate. Repeated proclamations and
adjournments were interposed, to allow time for prejudice and resentment
to subside: the whole proceeding might be annulled by a seasonable omen,
or the opposition of a tribune; and such popular trials were commonly
less formidable to innocence than they were favorable to guilt. But this
union of the judicial and legislative powers left it doubtful whether
the accused party was pardoned or acquitted; and, in the defence of
an illustrious client, the orators of Rome and Athens address their
arguments to the policy and benevolence, as well as to the justice, of
their sovereign. 2. The task of convening the citizens for the trial of
each offender became more difficult, as the citizens and the offenders
continually multiplied; and the ready expedient was adopted of
delegating the jurisdiction of the people to the ordinary magistrates,
or to extraordinary inquisitors. In the first ages these questions were
rare and occasional. In the beginning of the seventh century of Rome
they were made perpetual: four praetors were annually empowered to sit
in judgment on the state offences of treason, extortion, peculation, and
bribery; and Sylla added new praetors and new questions for those
crimes which more directly injure the sa