t was from this probably that proprietorship was
named, 2. In jure cessio, which was a solemn delivering over before the
praetor. 3. Adjudicatio, made by a judge, in a case of partition.
4. Lex, which comprehended modes of acquiring in particular cases
determined by law; probably the law of the xii. tables; for instance,
the sub corona emptio and the legatum.
5. Usna, called afterwards usacapio, and by the moderns prescription.
This was only a year for movables; two years for things not movable. Its
primary object was altogether different from that of prescription in
the present day. It was originally introduced in order to transform
the simple possession of a thing (in bonis habere) into Roman
proprietorship. The public and uninterrupted possession of a thing,
enjoyed for the space of one or two years, was sufficient to make known
to the inhabitants of the city of Rome to whom the thing belonged. This
last mode of acquisition completed the system of civil acquisitions. by
legalizing. as it were, every other kind of acquisition which was not
conferred, from the commencement, by the Jus Quiritium. V. Ulpian.
Fragm. i. 16. Gaius, ii. 14. We believe, according to Gaius, 43, that
this usucaption was extended to the case where a thing had been acquired
from a person not the real proprietor; and that according to the time
prescribed, it gave to the possessor the Roman proprietorship. But this
does not appear to have been the original design of this Institution.
Caeterum etiam earum rerum usucapio nobis competit, quae non a domino
nobis tradita fuerint, si modo eas bona fide acceperimus Gaius, l ii.
43. As to things of smaller value, or those which it was difficult to
distinguish from each other, the solemnities of which we speak were not
requisite to obtain legal proprietorship.
In this case simple delivery was sufficient.
In proportion to the aggrandizement of the Republic, this latter
principle became more important from the increase of the commerce and
wealth of the state. It was necessary to know what were those things of
which absolute property might be acquired by simple delivery, and what,
on the contrary, those, the acquisition of which must be sanctioned
by these solemnities. This question was necessarily to be decided by
a general rule; and it is this rule which establishes the distinction
between res mancipi and nec mancipi, a distinction about which the
opinions of modern civilians differ so much that there are abo