ds England from the reproach of indifference
to the higher philosophy. Americans are at least not indifferent to John
Stuart Mill; and for his sake the volumes will no doubt be attempted by
many a respectable citizen who would be seriously puzzled whether to
class the author as a Cosmothetic Idealist or as a Hypothetical Dualist.
And assuming, as such a reader very possibly will, that this last name
designates those who are disposed to fight for their hypotheses, he will
hardly think it in this case a misnomer. Yet Mr. Mill seems very
generous and noble in this attitude. He has consented to put on the
gloves since he fought Professors Whewell and Sedgwick without them; and
there is perhaps no finer passage in the history of controversy than his
simple expression of regret, in his preface, on attacking an antagonist
who can no longer defend himself.

Yet his handling of Sir William is tolerably unflinching, when he
settles to the work; and he will carry the sympathy of most readers in
his criticisms, whatever they may think of his own peculiar views. The
students of his Logic were rather daunted, years ago, on discovering
that a mind so able was content to found upon mere experience its
conviction that two and two make four, and to assume, by implication at
least, that on some other planet two and two may make five. He still
holds to this attitude. But so perfect are his candor and clearness,
that no dissent from his views can seriously impair the value of his
writings; and though no amount of clearness can make such a book
otherwise than abstruse to the general reader, yet there are some
chapters which can be read with pleasure and profit by any intelligent
person,--as, for instance, the closing essay on mathematical study. This
must not, however, be taken for an indorsement of all which that chapter
contains; for it must be pronounced a little inconsistent in Mr. Mill to
criticize Hamilton for underrating mathematics without having studied
them, when this seems to be precisely his critic's attitude towards the
later German metaphysics. He speaks with some slight respect of Kant, to
be sure, but complains of the speculations of his successors as "a
deplorable waste of time and power," though he gives no hint or citation
to indicate that he has read one original sentence of Fichte, Schelling,
or Hegel. Indeed, he heaps contempt in Latin superlatives upon the
last-named thinker, and then completes the insult by quoting him