f mutual slaughter and outrage. The
outcome of all this was a futile reversion to the _status quo_. In 1556,
indeed, the conclusion of a truce left Corsica--with the exception of
Bastia--in the hands of the French, who proceeded to set up a tolerable
government; but in 1559, by the treaty of Cateau-Cambresis, the island
was restored to the bank of San Giorgio, from which it was at once taken
over by the Genoese republic.

Sampiero da Bastelica.

Trouble at once began again. The Genoese attempted to levy a tax which
the Corsicans refused to pay; in violation of the terms of the treaty,
which had stipulated for a universal amnesty, they confiscated the
property of Sampiero da Bastelica. Hereupon Sampiero again put himself
at the head of the national movement. The suzerainty of the Turk seemed
preferable to that of Genoa, and, armed with letters from the king of
France, he went to Constantinople to ask the aid of a fleet for the
purpose of reducing Corsica to the status of an Ottoman province.[2] All
his efforts to secure foreign help were, however, vain; he determined to
act alone, and in June 1564 landed at Valinco with only fifty followers.
His success was at first extraordinary, and he was soon at the head of
8000 men; but ultimate victory was rendered impossible by the
indiscipline among the Corsicans and by the internecine feuds of which
the Genoese well knew how to take advantage. For over two years a war
was waged in which quarter was given on neither side; but after the
assassination of Sampiero in 1567 the spirit of the insurgents was
broken. In 1568 an honourable peace, including a general amnesty, was
arranged with the Genoese commander Giorgio Doria by Sampiero's son
Alphonso d'Ornano, who with 300 of his friends emigrated to France,
where he rose to be a marshal under Henry IV.

From this time until 1729 Corsica remained at peace under the government
of Genoa. It was, however, a peace due to lassitude and despair rather
than contentment. The settlement of 1568 had reserved a large measure of
autonomy to the Corsicans; during the years that followed this was
withdrawn piecemeal, until, disarmed and powerless, they were excluded
from every office in the administration. Nor did the Genoese substitute
any efficient system for that which they had destroyed. In the absence
of an effective judiciary the _vendetta_ increased; in the absence of
effective protection the sea-board was exposed to the ravages of the