nd no localised corporation could take lands by devise,
save for charitable purposes. Then came the act of 1736, commonly but
improperly called the Mortmain Act. Its effect was generally to make it
impossible for land to be left by will for charitable uses, whether
through a corporation or a natural person[1]. The Wills Act 1837 did not
renew the old provision against devises to corporations, which therefore
fell under the general law of mortmain. The law was consolidated by the
Mortmain and Charitable Uses Act 1888, and the result is simply that
corporations cannot take land for any purpose without a licence, and no
licence in mortmain is granted by the crown, except in certain statutory
cases in the interests of religion, charity or other definite public
object.

The power of corporations at common law to alienate their property is
usually restricted, as is their power to lease it for more than a
certain number of years, except by sanction of a public authority. The
more important classes of corporations, however, are now governed by
special statutes which exclude or modify the operation of the common law
principles. The most considerable class of societies still unaffected by
such special legislation are the Livery Companies (q.v.). Under COMPANY
will be found an account of the important enactments regulating
joint-stock companies.

The question to what extent the common law incidents of a corporation
have been interfered with by special legislation has become one of much
importance, especially under the acts relating to joint-stock companies.
The most important case on this subject is that of _Riche_ v. _The
Ashbury Railway Carriage Company_, 1875 (L.R. 9 Ex. 224; L.R. 7 H.L.
653), in which, the judges of the exchequer chamber being equally
divided, the decision of the court below was affirmed. The view taken by
the affirming judges, viz. that the common law incidents of a
corporation adhere unless expressly removed by the legislature, may be
illustrated by a short extract from the judgment of Mr Justice
Blackburn:--

"If I thought it was at common law an incident to a corporation that
its capacity should be limited by the instrument creating it, I should
agree that the capacity of a company incorporated under the act of
1862 was limited to the object in the memorandum of association. But
if I am right in the opinion which I have already expressed, that the
general power of contracting is an incident