yland and Kentucky, but made head strongly and at the end of
it were at the height of their power, with the North badly defeated at all
points save one. The writer considers that the battle of Stone's River, or
Murfreesboro, on December 31st, was the military turning-point of the war,
though the Confederates made various strokes at different times for
political purposes, which, had they succeeded, might have attained their
end, the chief of which was the campaign of Gettysburg. From a purely
military point of view, however, nothing could save the Confederacy unless
the results of Stone's River were undone. The year 1863 opened with the
Confederates fought out; they had made their effort but could not maintain
it, and had failed to secure the centre of the strategical line which was
vital for both sides."--"The American Civil War," Formby; London, John
Murray, 1910.

NOTES TO CHAPTER II.

"... That my opinion was founded upon a false estimate of the facts was
the very least part of my fault. I did not perceive the gross impropriety
of such an utterance from a cabinet minister, of a power united in blood
and language, and bound to loyal neutrality; the case being further
exaggerated by the fact that we were already, so to speak, under
indictment before the world, for not--as was alleged--having strictly
enforced the laws of neutrality in the matter of the cruisers. My offence
was indeed only a mistake, but one of incredible grossness, and with such
consequences of offence and alarm attached to it, that my failing to
perceive them justly exposed me to very severe blame...."--Gladstonian
fragment, "Life of Gladstone," Morley; New York. The Macmillan Company,
1911.

NOTES TO CHAPTER III.

"Further to mislead the enemy as to the point from which the attack was to
be made, long lines of camp-fires were started on McCook's right and
commands given by staff-officers to imaginary regiments in tones loud
enough to be heard by the enemy's skirmishers, to induce the Confederates
to think that our line extended much further to the right than it actually
did. I have always doubted whether Bragg was misled or deceived by this
subterfuge; and not unlikely he considered it a confession of weakness on
our right and formed his own plans accordingly."--"The Murfreesboro
Campaign," Otis; Boston. Papers of the Military Historical Society of
Massachusetts, Vol. VII, 1908.

NOTES TO CHAPTER VI.

"At this juncture, Colonel John F. M