it under a general name, called durbar charges,--a name which,
in its extent at least, was very much his own invention, and which, as
he gives no account of those charges, is as large and sufficient to
cover any fraudulent expenditure in the account as, one would think, any
person could wish. You see him, then, first guessing one thing, then
another,--first giving this reason, then another; at last, however, he
seems to be satisfied that he has hit upon the true reason of his
conduct.
Now let us open the next paragraph, and see what it is.--"Although I am
firmly persuaded that these were my sentiments on the occasion, yet I
will not affirm that they were. Though I feel their impression as the
remains of a series of thoughts retained on my memory, I am not certain
that they may not have been produced by subsequent reflection on the
principal fact, combining with it the probable motives of it. Of this I
am certain, that it was my design originally to have concealed the
receipt of all the sums, except the second, even from the knowledge of
the Court of Directors. They had answered my purpose of public utility,
and I had almost dismissed them from my remembrance."
My Lords, you will observe in this most astonishing account which he
gives here, that several of these sums he meant to conceal forever, even
from the knowledge of the Directors. Look back to his letter of 22d May,
1782, and his letter of the 16th of December, and in them he tells you
that he might have concealed them, but that he was resolved not to
conceal them; that he thought it highly dishonorable so to do; that his
conscience would have been wounded, if he had done it; and that he was
afraid it would be thought that this discovery was brought from him in
consequence of the Parliamentary inquiries. Here he says of a discovery
which he values himself upon making voluntarily, that he is afraid it
should be attributed to arise from motives of fear. Now, at last, he
tells you, from Cheltenham, at a time when he had just cause to dread
the strict account to which he is called this day, first, that he cannot
tell whether any one motive which he assigns, either in this letter or
in the former, were his real motive or not; that he does not know
whether he has not invented them since, in consequence of a train of
meditation upon what he might have done or might have said; and, lastly,
he says, contrary to all his former declarations, "that he had never
meant nor co
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