mony and one concomitant ideal result. The most rudimentary
apperception, recognition, or expectation, is already a case of
representative cognition, of transitive thought resting in a permanent
essence. Memory is an obvious case of the same thing; for the past, in
its truth, is a system of experiences in relation, a system now
non-existent and never, as a system, itself experienced, yet confronted
in retrospect and made the ideal object and standard for all historical
thinking.
[Sidenote: So-called abstractions complete facts.]
These arrested and recognisable ideas, concretions of similars
succeeding one another in time, are not abstractions; but they may come
to be regarded as such after the other kind of concretions in
experience, concretions of superposed perceptions in space, have become
the leading objects of attention. The sensuous material for both
concretions is the same; the perception which, recurring in different
objects otherwise not retained in memory gives the idea of roundness, is
the same perception which helps to constitute the spatial concretion
called the sun. Roundness may therefore be carelessly called an
abstraction from the real object "sun"; whereas the peculiar
optical and muscular feelings by which the sense of roundness is
constituted--probably feelings of gyration and perpetual unbroken
movement--are much earlier than any solar observations; they are a
self-sufficing element in experience which, by repetition in various
accidental contests, has come to be recognised and named, and to be a
characteristic by virtue of which more complex objects can be
distinguished and defined. The idea of the sun is a much later product,
and the real sun is so far from being an original datum from which
roundness is abstracted, that it is an ulterior and quite ideal
construction, a spatial concretion into which the logical concretion
roundness enters as a prior and independent factor. Roundness may be
felt in the dark, by a mere suggestion of motion, and is a complete
experience in itself. When this recognisable experience happens to be
associated by contiguity with other recognisable experiences of heat,
light, height, and yellowness, and these various independent objects are
projected into the same portion of a real space; then a concretion
occurs, and these ideas being recognised in that region and finding a
momentary embodiment there, become the qualities of a thing.
A conceived thing is doubly a pr
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